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THE FIRST RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ON THE
TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS SUCCESSOR:
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN
TRADITIONAL COURTS
WILLIAM M. RiCHMAN*
DAVID RILEY**
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years after the adoption of its successor,1 the first Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws' persists as the dominant choice-of-law
methodology in eleven states and as an important part of the conflicts
landscape in five more.' Say what you will, it's got legs. But do con-
temporary First Restatement courts apply the same wooden, mechanical,
choice-of-law system we teach our students in the conflicts survey
course? Does the system still rely on the metaphysics of vested rights?
Does it persist in applying the law of the disinterested state in false
conflicts cases? Are choice-of-law clauses still disfavored? Do the
courts continue to avoid egregious results via manipulation of the
rules and the escape devices of recharacterization, renvoi, and public
policy? Finally, with the passing of guest statutes, what substantive law
issues remain to provide the fodder for the system?
With these questions in mind, I examined appellate decisions
from 1971 through 1996 in the states usually considered to be adher-
ents to the First Restatement.4 The goal of this Article is a description of
the First Restatement as a current (if not modern) choice-of-law regime
and a comparison of that current regime with the traditional First Re-
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., University of Penn-
sylvania; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law.
** I wish to thank David Riley, J.D., 1997, University of Toledo College of Law. Mr.
Riley served as research assistant for this project, but his contributions went far beyond that
role. Although he did not share in drafting this Article, his research and analysis were
invaluable. Moreover, after a while, I began to notice that he gave me no time cards to
sign. When I asked him about that, he said that he had been awarded a third-year tuition
scholarship by the college (he graduated first in his class), and thus did not think he
should be paid for his research.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971).
2. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
3. See infra tbl.II.
4. I used the states identified in Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38
HAsTINGs L.J. 1041 app. at 1172-74 (1987), mostly for sentimental reasons. Smith was a
student in my conflicts course, and his article, now widely cited by the courts, was his semi-
nar paper for that course.
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statement system that existed in the middle of this century, unmodified
by the choice-of-law revolution. The idea, in other words, is to deter-
mine how the Second Restatement and the choice-of-law revolution have
affected theory and practice in the courts that still claim to adhere to
the First Restatement. Part I briefly discusses First Restatement theory and
practice before the conflicts revolution. Part II then analyzes the
more contemporary cases in the states that continue to apply the First
Restatement.
I. TRADITIONALISM UNMODIFIED: PRE-REvOLUTIONARY THEORY
AND PRACTICE5
According to the standard account, the theoretical basis for the
First Restatement system for choice-of-law was the vested rights theory.
Developed in this country by Joseph H. Beale6 and in England by A.V.
Dicey,7 the theory explained the forum's use of foreign legal rules in
terms of the creation and enforcement of vested rights. According to
the theory, the only law that could operate in a foreign territory was
the law of the foreign sovereign.8 When an event (a tort, for exam-
ple) occurred in the foreign territory, a right was created; the content
of that right, of course, could be determined only by reference to the
foreign law. The role of the forum court in the choice-of-law process
was merely to enforce the right that had vested in the foreign territory
according to the foreign law.9
Crucial for practice under the vested rights theory was to deter-
mine when and where a particular right vested, because the law in
place where the right vested would control the content of the right.10
The theory spawned a series of rules, each governing a major area of
the law, such as torts, contracts, and property, that controlled the
choice-of-law process by identifying a particular contact as the trigger
for the vesting of a right. Thus, courts referred tort choice-of-law is-
sues to the law of the place of injury," contract issues to the law of the
5. The content and language of this section follows that used in WILLIAM M. RICHMAN
& WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 168-71, 188-90 (2d ed. 1992).
6. See 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1967-69 (1935).
7. SeeA.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT
OF LAws 17-25 (A. Berriedale Keith ed., 5th ed. 1932).
8. See 3 BEALE, supra note 6, at 1968; DICEY, supra note 7, at 17-25.
9. See 3 BEALE, supra note 6, at 1968; DIcEY, supra note 7, at 17-25.
10. See 3 BEALE, supra note 6, at 1968; DIcEy, supra note 7, at 17-25.
11. See 2JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1045 (1935).
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place of making,12 and property matters to the law of the situs of the
land.13
Choice-of-law practice in mid-century First Restatement courts thus
depended upon a few broad, single-contact, jurisdiction-selecting
rules moderated by three escape devices.14 Because the rules were few
and broad, courts lumped together cases and issues that seemed quite
unrelated.15 In tort cases, for example, traditionalist courts pre-
scribed the law of the place of injury for all torts, from defamation to
battery to misrepresentation.16 On the other hand, the First Restate-
ment's categories sometimes separated problems that should have
been closely linked. In a two-count product liability case, for example,
First Restatement courts traditionally applied the law of the place of in-
jury to the strict liability tort count, and the law of the place of making
to the implied warranty count.
17
12. See id. at 1288-1305.
13. See id. at 933. Walter Wheeler Cook led the attack on the vested rights theory even
before the adoption of the First Restatement in 1934. See Walter W. Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws, 33YALE LJ. 457 (1924); see also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territorial-
ity, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 743 (1924) (citing confusion
within the case law); Hessel Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE
L.J. 468, 477-83 (1928) (questioning the methodology behind the vested rights theory).
The attack relied on the legal realist theory that a right is merely a prediction that a court
will recognize a plaintiffs claim. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) (distinguishing between rights in a moral sense and rights enforce-
able by the courts); see also R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 619-36 (1976) (providing a history
of legal realist thinking). According to the predictive theory, rights do not exist indepen-
dently before courts enforce them; thus it made no sense to speak of "enforcing vested
rights" in choice-of-laws cases. See Cook, supra, at 478. Until the court decided a case,
there was no right for it to enforce. See id.
Cook also argued that the vested rights theory was an inaccurate account of the courts'
actual choice-of-law practice. See id. at 467-70. According to the predictive theory, a "for-
eign right" is a prediction about what a foreign court would do if faced with the exact facts
of the case at bar. See id. at 481. To make such a prediction, the forum court would have
to apply the foreign choice-of-law rules as well as the foreign internal rule; in other words,
the court would have to apply the doctrine of renvoi. See id. at 468-69. Because courts do
not routinely apply the doctrine of renvoi to all choice-of-law problems, Cook concluded
that the enforcement of vested rights was not a useful model to explain choice-of-law deci-
sions. See id. at 469.
14. See generally WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CON-
FLICr OF LAws 131-54 (1st ed. 1984) (analyzing First Restatement practice and theory).
15. See id. at 134-35.
16. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFUCT OF LAws §§ 378-380, 383, 385 (1934) (stating that
"the law of the place of wrong" determines legal injury, liability-creating conduct, standard
of care, causation, and contributory negligence in tort cases).
17. Compare id. § 379 cmt. F, with id § 323 illus. 4.
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The rules were jurisdiction-selecting, and thus courts picked be-
tween competing states, rather than competing rules.18 Traditionalist
courts did not consider the content of the substantive rules of law
until after the state had been chosen. Accordingly, these courts were
not concerned with which law was "better" or which law validated the
parties' intentions, nor did they consider whether the policy behind
the chosen substantive law could be advanced by applying it in the
particular case. As a result, in false conflicts cases, First Restatement
courts often chose the law of a state with no interest in the resolution
of the dispute. 9
Further, because the rules relied upon only a single connection
between the dispute and the state, courts could select the law of a state
that was only minimally connected to the case. The place-of-making
rule, for instance, chose the law of the state where the contract was
executed, no matter how fortuitous, even though another state was
the site of negotiation, performance, and the residence of the
20parties.
Faced with unpalatable results, traditionalist courts sometimes at-
tempted to evade the simple, hard-and-fast rules by manipulating
them21 or by employing conceptualistic escape devices-recharacter-
ization,2 2 renvoi,23 and public policy.24 Although these evasive maneu-
vers produced better results in individual cases, they threatened to
18. See, e.g., id. §§ 214 (law of the state where the thing is), 332 (law of the place of
contracting), 378 (law of the place of the wrong), 121 (law of the state where the contract of
marriage takes place), 303 (law of the state of decedent's domicile) (emphasis added).
David Cavers invented the term "jurisdiction-selecting" and opposed it to choice-of-law
rules that were law-selecting or content-selecting. See David Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-
of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933); see also ROBERT LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN
CONFLIcrs LAw 283 (4th ed. 1986).
19. See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 809 (Ala. 1892) (applying
Mississippi law even though Alabama was the only interested state).
20. See DAVID VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAwS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 231
n.7 (1990).
21. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1878) (interpreting a contract be-
tween a Massachusetts wife and a Maine creditor to be a unilateral contract formed in
Maine by the creditor's performance, a maneuver that resulted in Massachusetts's place-of-
making rule's referring to Maine capacity law, which validated the contract).
22. See, e.g., Duckwall v. Lease, 20 N.E.2d 204, 211 (Ind. App. 1939) (using "equitable
conversion" to save a testamentary gift from Indiana's lapse rule by characterizing the
property as personal rather than real).
23. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. Dater, 270 N.W. 175, 176 (Mich. 1936) (applying
Michigan contract law because Michigan's choice-of-law rule referred to Illinois law and
Illinois's choice-of-law rule referred the issue back to Michigan's internal law).
24. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961) (holding
that "strong public policy" reasons prohibited the court from applying the wrongful death
damage limitations rules of Massachusetts).
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compromise the First Restatement's vaunted virtues of simplicity, pre-
dictability, and forum neutrality. 25
II. CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Allegiance
1. A Dwindling Minority.-The first question to consider in as-
sessing the current state of the First Restatement is its prevalence; how
many states continue to use it in any form? As anyone who reads con-
flicts opinions or surveys knows, counting and classifying is problem-
atic. Opinions are eclectic; federal courts incorrectly predict
decisions of state supreme courts, and there is the significant question
of dictum versus holding. Tables 1 and 2 summarize two groups of
surveys. Table 1 is the group contained in the American Journal of Com-
parative Law, compiled by P. John Kozyris, Symeon C. Symeonides,
and Michael E. Solimine. Table 2 summarizes surveys compiled by
Herma Kay, Greg Smith, Patrick Borchers, and William M. Richman,
published in otherjournals. Differences are small and relatively insig-
nificant, and the trend is clear in both. The results, indicated in both
tables, clearly show that adherence to the First Restatement is in decline,
and, moreover, that the decline has continued steadily since the first
wave of defections accompanying the Second Restatement and the
choice-of-law revolution. From twenty-nine in 1983, the total number
of states using any substantial part of the First Restatement declined to
twenty-five in 1986, nineteen in 1992, and sixteen today.26 In sum,
nine states have abandoned the system in the last decade, and three
defections occurred over the last three years.
Further, the current total of sixteen clearly overstates the preva-
lence of the traditional system. Only eleven states use the First Restate-
ment as their predominant choice-of-law methodology.27 Four more
states use it in contracts, but have switched to one of the more mod-
ern methods for tort cases.2 8 Only one state, Montana, is listed as do-
ing the reverse (First Restatement for torts, modern method for
contracts),29 but the listing is really by default because Montana has
not decided a tort choice-of-law case in the last twenty-five years.3"
25. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAws at viii-ix (1934) (citing the purpose of the Restatement as "certainty and clarity").
26. See infra tbl.II.
27. See supra tbl.II.
28. See supra tbl.II.
29. See supra tbl.II.
30. See Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 521 app. at 591 (1983); Smith, supra note 4, at 1093-94.
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D- Number of States Using First Restatement for Tort and Contract
1988: Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37 AM.
J. COMP. L. 457, 459 (1989).
1989: P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 601, 604 (1992).
1991: Michael E. Solimine, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1991, 40 AM.J.
ComP. L. 951, 951 (1992).
1993: Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1993 (and in
the Six previous years), 42 AM. J. CoMp. L. 599, 608-09 (1994).
1994: Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995: A View
"From the Trenches", 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3-4 (1995).
1995: Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995: A Year
in Review, 44 Am. J. COMP. L. 181, 197-98 (1996).
Finally, adherence to the First Restatement, even within the listed states,
is spotty and full of exceptions for statutory choice-of-law rules, 31 Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) cases,32 insurance cases, 33 workers'
compensation disputes,34 and choice-of-law clauses.35
31. See infta note 86 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part II.B.4.
33. See infra Part I.D.
34. See infra Part II.B.3.
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TABLE I
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW SURVEYS
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TABLE II
SURVEYS NOT REPORTED IN THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIVE LAW
28 Ala.
Alaska
Ariz. (k)
Ark. (k)
Conn.
Del.
D.C.
Fla. (k)
20 Ga.
Ind. (t)
Kan.
Md.
Mich. (k)
Mont.
Neb.
Nev.
N.M.
N.C.
10 Ohio
Okla. (k)
R.I. (k)
S.C.
S.D.
Tenn.
Vt.
Va.
W.Va.
Wyo.
Kay
1983
Ala.
Alaska (k)
Ariz. (k)
Ark. (k)
Del. (t)
Fla. (k)
Ga.
Ind. (t)
Kan.
Md.
Mich.
Mont.
Nev.
N.M.
N.C.
Okla. (k)
R.I. (k)
S.C.
S.D.
Tenn.
Utah
Vt.
Va.
W.Va.
Wyo.
Smith
1986
Ala.
Conn. (k)
Fla. (k)
Ga.
Kan.
Md.
Mich. (k)
Mont.
Nev.
N.M.
N.C.
Okla. (k)
S.C.
S.D.
Tenn.
Vt.
Va.
W.Va.
Wyo.
Borchers
1992
Ala.
Conn. (k)
Fla. (k)
Ga.
Kan.
Md.
Mich. (k)
Mont. (t)*
N.M.
N.C.
Okla. (k)
S.C.
Tenn.
Va.
W.Va.
Wyo.
Richman
1996
*No recent tort cases
1983: Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 521, 582, app. at 591-92 (1983). Kay lists these states in the "traditional" choice
of law category. Id.
1986: Smith, supra note 5, at 1050-1169.
1992: PatrickJ. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 357 tbl. II at 370-72 & 373 n.112.
2. To Retain or Abandon.-The reasons articulated in recent
opinions retaining the First Restatement are mostly familiar. A mild sur-
prise is that the vested rights theory-the First Restatement's original
35. See infra Part II.B.1.
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theoretical foundation-is almost dead. Only two recent intermedi-
ate appellate decisions in North Carolina rely on it at all. 6 Strangely,
the most recent of these decisions treats the theory as though it were
alive and well, in language suggesting a jurisprudential time-warp:
The law of the place where the injury occurs controls tort
claims, because an act has legal significance only if the juris-
diction where it occurs recognizes that legal rights and obli-
gations ensue from it .... "If a legal right arises at the locus
[of the injury], this right vests in the injured party and he
may enforce it not only at the locus but in the courts of other
states and nations as well. If no right exists at the locus,
there is none to enforce anywhere. 3 7
Somewhat more modern, but still in the same vein, is an opinion rely-
ing on comity3 8 and one highlighting the interests of the place of in-
jury in regulating wrongful conduct there.9
Legal process concerns motivated other courts to retain the tradi-
tional system. Some opinions appeal simply to stare decisis.4 ° Others
suggest that any change from lex loci (law of the place) should be the
province of the state's highest court or its legislature. 4'
By far, however, the most frequently cited reasons to retain the
traditional system are the vices of the more modern choice-of-law ap-
proaches. Among them is one that sounds strange to the modern
36. See Terry v. Pullman Trailmobile, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 47, 49 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (rul-
ing that all legal rights vest in state where injury takes place); Chewning v. Chewning, 201
S.E.2d 353, 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
37. Terry, 376 S.E.2d at 49 (quoting Seymour W. Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North
Carolina, 48 N.C. L. REv. 243 (1970)).
38. See Abendschein v. Farrell, 170 N.W.2d 137 (Mich. 1969). In his opinion, Justice
Black notes:
"Attempts to make the law or public policy of New York State prevail over the laws
and policies of other States where citizens of New York State are concerned are
simply a form of extraterritoriality which can be turned against us wherever ac-
tions are brought in the courts of New York which involve citizens of other
States."
Id. at 142 (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 286 (N.Y. 1963) (Van Voohris, J.,
dissenting)).
39. See Hauch v. Connor, 453 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Md. 1983).
40. See, e.g., Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tenn. 1972) ("In regard to torts
the rule has long prevailed in Tennessee that absent public policy the law of the place
where the tort occurred would control." (citations omitted)).
41. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 630 A.2d 261, 269 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992) ("[C]hanging the law in Maryland is the province of the Court of
Appeals and the General Assembly."); Abendschein, 170 N.W.2d at 140-41 ("[A]ny repudia-
tion of our standing rule lex loci should be made by some legislative measure. .. ."); Wil-
liaford v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 94960-2 R.D., 1988 WL 77627, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
28, 1988) (noting court must follow decisions of legislature or state supreme court).
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ear-several opinions remark that the states that have discarded the
traditional system have failed to reach a consensus on a replacement,
adhering variably to the center-of-gravity, significant-relationship, in-
terest analysis, and choice-influencing considerations.4 2 Worse yet, ac-
cording to one court, are the confusing and uneven results that occur
within a single state after abandoning lex loci:
It was perhaps recognition of just such gross disparities in
result that prompted the Court of Appeals of New York to
remark, in a towering achievement in the art of understate-
ment, "candor requires the admission that our past decisions
have lacked a precise consistency."4"
The modern systems are thought to be "confusing,"44 unpredictable,"
manipulable,46 result oriented,47 and incapable of providing guidance
to the courts.48
In contrast, traditionalist courts found the virtues of the First Re-
statement to be "stability,"49 "predictability and certainty,"" and "ease
of application."51 The most spirited defense of the traditional, rule-
based system comes in Paul v. National Life.5 2 Citing a Wisconsin case
endorsing the Second Restatement as a "method of analysis that per-
mit[ted] dissection of the jural bundle constituting a tort and its envi-
ronment,""3 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals responded:
42. See, e.g., Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 822 (Ala. 1991)
("U]urisdictions are not unanimous as to what th[e] 'modern approach' should be.");
General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ga. 1984) (citing other jurisdictions as
saying that the center-of-gravity rule is just as confusing as the traditional approach); State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conyers, 784 P.2d 986, 990 (N.M. 1989) (noting confusion between
significant-relationship test and lex loci contractus test); First Nat'l Bank v. Benson, 553 P.2d
1288, 1289 (N.M. 1976) (noting that the "significant contacts choice-of-law" rule is in a
"state of uncertainty"); Williaford. 1988 WL 77627, at *4 (noting that "no significant pro-
gress toward uniformity" had been made since an earlier higher court opinion).
43. Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 1986) (citation omitted).
44. Conyers, 784 P.2d at 990.
45. See Benson, 553 P.2d at 1289 (recognizing that choice-of-law decisions are often
based on each judge's individual views as to what is just).
46. See Pau4 352 S.E.2d at 554 (explaining how courts can manipulate results under the
modem and traditional systems).
47. See Benson, 553 P.2d at 1290 (noting that the result of a case depends on who the
judge wishes to protect).
48. See Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 822 (Ala. 1991) (recogniz-
ing at least six different modern approaches).
49. Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1988).
50. Hauch v. Connor, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (Md. 1983).
51. Pau4 352 S.E.2d at 555. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also ob-
served that other virtues of the First Restatement are "consistency" and "predictability." Id.
52. 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986).
53. Id. at 554.
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That sounds pretty intellectual, but we still prefer a rule.
The lesson of history is that methods of analysis that permit
dissection of the jural bundle constituting a tort and its envi-
ronment produce protracted litigation and voluminous, in-
scrutable appellate opinions, while rules get cases settled
quickly and cheaply.54
The court in Paul determined that most of the dissatisfaction with
the traditional system arose in cases involving guest statutes, in-
trafamily immunity, and contributory negligence. Yet these doctrines
are rapidly disappearing, leaving reform-oriented courts with cumber-
some, modern choice-of-law systems that produce mischief long after
the substantive-law evils that provoked them have disappeared.55 Fi-
nally, faced with the argument that the system of escape devices had
robbed the First Restatement of its claimed virtues of certainty, uniform-
ity, and predictability, the Paul court responded with an unanswerable
piece of traditional choice-of-law logic:
There is certainly some truth in this, and we generally es-
chew the more strained escape devices employed to avoid
the sometimes harsh effects of the traditional rule. Never-
theless, we remain convinced that the traditional rule, for all
of its faults, remains superior to any of its modem competi-
tors. Moreover, if we are going to manipulate conflicts doc-
trine in order to achieve substantive results, we might as well
manipulate something we understand. Having mastered
marble, we decline an apprenticeship in bronze. We there-
fore reaffirm our adherence to the doctrine of lex loci delicti
today. 6
Courts that have recently abandoned the First Restatement note
that it no longer fits the times.57 The vested rights theory, with its
excessive emphasis on the sanctity of state boundaries, makes little
sense in an increasingly mobile world.5" As a result, the consensus of
states has moved away from the lex loci and toward the modern meth-
ods; oddly, that shifting consensus is the most frequently cited reason
54. Id.
55. See id. at 551-52.
56. Id. at 556.
57. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 46 (Del. 1991) (abandoning the
lex loci delicti choice-of-law standard because "it is a doctrine that has lost its place in the
growth of modern law"); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tenn. 1992) (conclud-
ing that the doctrine of lex loci "is outmoded because of changes in society").
58. See Lake, 594 A.2d at 44; Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 57.
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to join the exodus.9 Some courts citing the lost consensus indicate
that it robs the First Restatement of one of its principal selling points-
national uniformity and thus forum neutrality.6" Therefore, reliance
on lost consensus is not merely an argument based on jurisprudential
"fashion."
Other courts abandoned the lex loci doctrine because of its seri-
ous practical flaws; it produces harsh results,61 ignores state inter-
ests," and applies the law of a state with no significant contact with
the dispute.6" Still others left the fold not for programmatic reasons
but because an alternative, modem approach yielded a better solution
to the particular choice-of-law issue before the court.64 Finally, rule
manipulation and the system of escape devices were the impetus in
several opinions.6 Although those maneuvers ameliorated the most
obvious defects of the First Restatement, they sacrificed the certainty,
predictability, and ease of application that are the lex locis principal
virtues."
3. Divided Loyalties.-Four states-Florida, Connecticut, Tennes-
see, and Oklahoma-have abandoned the First Restatement for tort
cases, but retain it for contract cases.6 7 This divided approach is clear-
59. See Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Ark. 1977) (in banc);
O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 20 (Conn. 1986); Lake, 594 A.2d at 44-45; Sturiano v.
Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1988); Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 56.
60. See, e.g., O'Connor, 519 A.2d at 20 (noting that "lex loci's arguable advantages of
uniformity and predictability have been undermined by its widespread rejection by courts
• . . that avoid its strict interpretation"); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d
843, 849-50 (Mich. 1982) (suggesting that, because a number of jurisdictions no longer
follow lex loci delicti, the rule loses its principle virtues of certainty and predictability).
61. See, e.g., O'Connor, 519 A.2d at 18; Sexton, 320 N.W.2d at 849; Motenko v. MGM Dist.,
Inc., 921 P.2d 933, 934 (Nev. 1996).
62. See, e.g., O'Connor, 519 A.2d at 18; Lake, 594 A.2d at 44; Sexton, 320 N.W.2d at 849;
Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 56.
63. See, e.g., O'Connor, 519 A.2d at 20 (rejecting lex loci in part because it ignores the
interest of the common domicile of the tort plaintiff and defendant in favor of the state of
injury, which had no interest in the case); Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d
999, 1001 (Fla. 1980) (adopting the Second Restatement's significant-relationship test be-
cause it "recognizes that the state where the injury occurred may have little actual signifi-
cance for the cause of action").
64. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. 1978) (rejecting the lex
loci delicti approach because it conflicted with Michigan public policy); Forsman v.
Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219 (Utah 1989) (adopting the Second Restatement's modern ap-
proach because it yielded a more desirable result in this case involving interspousal
immunity).
65. See O'Connor, 519 A.2d at 20; Lake, 594 A.2d at 45-46; Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 56.
66. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 68-88 and cases cited therein. Two additional states might also fit
this description, but their choice-of-law jurisprudence is too unclear to be certain. In Ver-
mont, the problem is the lack of unambiguous supreme court decisions. In Amiot v. Ames,
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est in Florida, where the state supreme court abandoned the law of
the place of injury in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.6" in 1980, but
announced its continued adherence to the place-of-contracting rule
in Sturiano v. Brooks 9 in 1988. Unlike most courts that split their alle-
giances, the Sturiano court offered a principled reason for its divided
loyalty:
We recognize that this Court has discarded the analogous
doctrine of lex loci delicti with respect to tort actions and
limitations of actions. However, we believe that the reason-
ing controlling those decisions does not apply in the instant
case. With tort law, there is no agreement, no foreseen set of
rules and statutes which the parties had recognized would
control the litigation. In the case of an insurance contract,
the parties enter into that contract with the acknowledgment
that the laws of that jurisdiction control their actions. In es-
sence, that jurisdiction's laws are incorporated by implica-
tion into the agreement. The parties to this contract did not
bargain for Florida or any other state's laws to control. We
693 A.2d 675, 677 (Vt. 1997), the court finally confirmed its adoption of the Second Restate-
ment for torts. The state's contract jurisprudence is unclear. In Pioneer Credit Corp. v.
Carden, 245 A.2d 891 (Vt. 1968), the court discussed the place-of-making rule and center-
of-gravity approach, but failed to apply either because of a failure of the parties to prove
the foreign law. Id. at 893-94. In Hitchcock Clinic, Inc. v. Mackie, 648 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1993),
the court characterized the issue of a wife's liability for her husband's debt as a domestic
relations matter rather than a contract problem and applied the law of the marital domi-
cile rather than the place of contract. The court then helpfully suggested that the marital
domicile had the "paramount interest," thus showing the same result followed under tradi-
tional and modern systems. Id. at 818-19.
Citing none of these decisions, a federal court confidently predicted that Vermont
would use the most-significant-relationship test. See Green Mountain Power Corp. v. Cer-
tain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 2:91-CV-385, 1995 WL 433597, at *2 (D. Vt. Sept.
30, 1994). Symeon C. Symeonides, relies on Green Mountain to classify Vermont as a Second
Restatement state in contracts. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1995: A Year in Review, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 181, 200 n.118 (1996).
Arkansas probably does not divide its loyalties between traditional and modem sys-
tems, but it is hard to tell for sure. In torts cases, the court is clear regarding its adherence
to the homegrown choice-influencing considerations of Professor Leflar. See Wallis v. Mrs.
Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Ark. 1977) (in banc). In contract cases, however,
Arkansas has vacillated. McMillen v. Winona National & Savings Bank, 648 S.W.2d 460 (Ark.
1983), and Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 181 (Ark. 1979) (in
banc), applied a "significant contacts" approach. McMillen, 648 S.W.2d at 462; Standard
Leasing, 576 S.W.2d at 184. Nonetheless, Stacy v. St. Charles Custom Kitchens, Inc., 683 S.W.2d
225 (Ark. 1985), may have reverted to the place-of-contracting rule. Id. at 227. In Stacy,
the court applied the law of the state where the contract was signed because both states
had substantial connections to the contract and the contracting state's law made the con-
tract "valid rather than void." Id. Symeonides classifies Arkansas as a "significant contacts"
jurisdiction for contract cases. See Symeonides, supra, at 196.
68. 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
69. 523 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1988).
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must presume that the parties did bargain for, or at least ex-
pected, New York law to apply.7v
Almost as clear is the situation in Connecticut. After opting for
the Second Restatement in O'Connor v. O'Conno 7a-a no-fault automo-
bile accident case-the Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless re-
tained the place-of-contracting rule in Williams v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.72
In Williams, an underinsured tortfeasor injured the plaintiff, a
Connecticut resident, in New York.73 The lower courts applied the
most-significant-relationship test from O'Connor and chose New York
law, thereby denying recovery.74 The plaintiff appealed to the Con-
necticut Supreme Court, arguing that the place-of-contracting rule re-
quired application of Connecticut law.7 5 The court agreed with the
plaintiffs contract choice-of-law analysis, but ultimately applied New
York law because the contract permitted recovery only if the plaintiff
was "legally entitled to collect" damages, a phrase that the court held
required a reference to the tort law of New York, the injury state.76
The choice-of-law split between contract and tort is somewhat less
certain in Tennessee, because its supreme court has not ratified it. In
Hataway v. McKinley,7 7 the Tennessee Supreme Court clearly aban-
doned the place-of-injury rule, but has not made a definite contract
ruling since then.78 In Walker v. Freeman,79 however, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals held that Hataway applied only to tort cases and that
the place-of-contracting rule remains valid in Tennessee."0
The choice-of-law split between contract and tort is the least clear
in Oklahoma. Although in 1974 its supreme court made a clean
break with the place-of-injury rule in Brickner v. GoodenF the situation
70. Id. at 1130 (footnotes omitted).
71. 519 A.2d 13, 21-22 (Conn. 1986).
72. 641 A.2d 783, 787 (Conn. 1994).
73. Id. at 784-85.
74. Id. at 785.
75. Id. at 786.
76. Id. at 787. I would be completely confident about my reading of this case, and thus
certain of Connecticut's divided loyalties, except that Professor Symeonides, who probably
has read more American choice-of-law decisions than anyone, reads Williams as a Second
Restatement case. See Symeonides, supra note 67, at 199 n.106.
77. 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992).
78. Id. at 59.
79. No. 03A01-9506-CH-00201, 1995 WL 749692 (Tenn. App. Dec. 19, 1995).
80. Id. at *3.
81. 525 P.2d 632, 637 (Okla. 1974) ("We hold as a general principle that the rights and
liabilities of parties with respect to a particular issue in tort shall be determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties.").
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in contract cases is more complicated. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court, like most current First Restatement courts,8 2 is particularly hospi-
table to choice-of-law clauses and uses section 187 of the Second Restate-
ment to evaluate them. 3 As a result, a fair amount of most-significant-
relationship discussions appear in Oklahoma Supreme Court opin-
ions. That, without more, however, does not portend a break with the
traditional system,8 4 because acceptance of choice-of-law clauses and
reference to section 187 have become routine in First Restatement
states.8 5
In non-choice-of-law clause cases, an Oklahoma statute governs
contract choice-of-law and requires interpretation of the contract ac-
cording to the "law ... of the place where it is to be performed, or, if
it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law...
of the place where it is made." 6 Under the influence, if not the com-
mand, of the statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adheres to the
First Restatement but cheerfully supplies plenty of most-significant-rela-
tionship dicta from the Second Restatement.
87
Complicating matters further, the court also has interpreted the
statute to permit an exception for auto insurance contract cases,
which are referred to the law of the place of making unless the terms
of the contract violate Oklahoma public policy, or unless "another ju-
risdiction has the most significant relationship with the subject matter
and the parties."8 8 A fair conclusion is that Oklahoma is probably still
a place-of-making state, but that it is teetering on the brink of adopt-
ing the Second Restatement.
Currently, no state divides loyalties in the opposite fashion-us-
ing the First Restatement in tort cases and a modern method in contract
cases-although two states provoke some controversy.8 9 Wyoming
clearly retains the place-of-injury rule.9" In contract cases, the court
82. See supra Part II.A.1. and cases cited therein.
83. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 298-99 (Okla. 1990).
84. See Symeonides, supra note 67, at 200 n.121 ("In general, reliance on [section] 187
with regard to choice-of-law clauses does not necessarily portend a more general adoption
of the Restatement Second for other issues of contract conflicts.").
85. See infra notes 116-119 and cases cited therein.
86. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 162 (1981).
87. See Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 288 (Okla. 1990).
88. Bohannon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 820 P.2d 787, 797 (Okla. 1991).
89. Montana is the third possibility. Its supreme court adopted the Second Restatement
for contract cases in Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 934-35 (Mont. 1994), but has not
decided a tort case since Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 512 P.2d 702, 706 (Mont. 1973)
(applying the place-of-injury rule to a libel action).
90. SeeJack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 899 P.2d 891, 894 (Wyo. 1995) ("It is thor-
oughly established as a general rule that the lex loci delicti, or the law of the place where
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uses section 187 for choice-of-law clauses,9 and in its U.C.C. cases uses
the Second Restatement's most-significant-relationship formula to inter-
pret the section 1-105 "appropriate relation" provision.92 Neverthe-
less, the use of section 187 and the U.C.C. choice-of-law provisions-
practices common in several First Restatement states-does not guaran-
tee abandonment of the place-of-making rule.9"
The North Carolina Supreme Court has announced that the state
will follow the First Restatement in both tort cases and contract cases.94
In contracts, however, two lines of cases confuse matters somewhat.
One set, dealing with U.C.C. warranty issues, reads section 1-105's "ap-
propriate relation" language to mean the same as the Second Restate-
ment's most-significant-relationship test.9 5  Yet once again, this
maneuver-common in traditional courts-probably does not signify
general abandonment of the place-of-making rule.
The second line of cases applies a North Carolina statute which
provides that all contracts insuring risks in North Carolina "shall be
deemed to have been made within this State and are subject to the
laws thereof."96 The result, although perfectly consistent with section
193 of the Second Restatement,97 is dependent entirely upon the statute
the tort or wrong has been committed, is the law that governs and is to be applied with
respect to the substantive phases of torts or the actions therefor...." (quoting Ball v. Ball,
269 P.2d 302, 304 (Wyo. 1954) (internal quotations omitted))).
91. See, e.g., Resource Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo.
1996) (following section 187's rule to apply the law of the state chosen by the parties in
their contract so long as it will not be contrary to the law, public policy, or the general
interest of the forum state).
92. See, e.g., Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter, 733 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Wyo. 1987) (ap-
plying "the law of the state bearing an appropriate relation to the totality of the transac-
tion" to a case involving a contract governed by the U.C.C.).
93. See infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
94. See Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 914, 915 (N.C. 1991) ("We do not hesi-
tate in holding that as to the tort law controlling the rights of the litigants in the lawsuit
allowed by this decision, the long-established doctrine of lex loci commissi applies.");
Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-54 (N.C. 1988) (applying lex loci in a breach of
warranty case).
95. See Boudreau, 368 S.E.2d at 855.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-1 (1996); see also, e.g., Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 416 S.E.2d 591, 594 (N.C. 1992) (applying § 58-3-1 to hold that an
insurance policy shall be subject to the laws of North Carolina).
97. Section 193 of the Second Restatement provides:
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and the rights cre-
ated thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties under-
stood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the
policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 193 (1971).
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and probably does not signal general adoption of a modem contract
choice-of-law approach. 98
In addition to the contemporary examples of divided loyalties,
recent history also suggests that a state court is likely to abandon the
lex loci rule in tort before doing so in contract.99 The reason may be,
as the Florida Supreme Court suggested, that predictability and reli-
ance are more important in contract than in tort cases. 100 An equally
likely hypothesis, however, is that courts abandon the place-of-injury
rule first simply because tort choice-of-law cases occur much more fre-
quently, outnumbering contract cases by two-to-one.
Three states provide exceptions to the torts-first approach.
Strangely, Indiana abandoned the place-of-contracting rule in
1945,01 but retained the place-of-injury rule until 1987.102 Delaware,
perhaps because of the heavy volume of interstate corporate litigation,
abandoned the place-of-contracting rule in 1978,103 yet retained the
place-of-injury rule until 1991.104 The third state, Nevada, is especially
interesting because of the progressive steps the court took in shifting
from the traditional system to a hybrid modem approach. The trans-
formation began in Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co. v. Diversified
Mortgage Investors,1" 5 a 1979 usury case. Relying on section 187 of the
Second Restatement, the Nevada Supreme Court held that it would en-
force a choice-of-law clause if the chosen state had a substantial rela-
tion with the transaction and its law did not violate the public policy of
98. But see Symeonides, supra note 67, at 200 n.l 19 (reading Boudreau to signal adop-
tion of modern approach, but acknowledging that his classification is "questionable").
99. Three recent switches are Michigan, Rhode Island, and Utah. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. 1995) (moving further away from the
traditional place-of-contracting rule in a contract case); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
320 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1982) (abandoning the place-of-injury rule in a tort case); Gordon
v. Clifford Metal Sales Co., 602 A.2d 535 (R.I. 1992) (suggesting an abandonment of the
place-of-contracting rule in a contract case); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.
1968) (abandoning the place-of-injury rule in a tort case); American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1996) (abandoning the place-of-making rule in an
insurance contract case); Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989) (abandoning the
place-of-injury rule in a tort case).
100. See Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla. 1988) (recognizing that, unlike
in tort cases, the parties in contract cases often bargain for a particular state's law to apply).
101. See W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945); see also Geri J.
Yanover, Essay: The Golden Anniversary of the Choice of Law Revolution: Indiana Fired the First
Shot, 29 IND. L. REV. 1201 (1996) (discussing the significance of the Barber court's decision
to abandon the place-of-contracting rule).
102. See Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Ind. 1987).
103. See Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 394 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Del.
1978).
104. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 46-47 (Del. 1991).
105. 603 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1979).
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Nevada.1" 6 Although use of section 187 does not always, or even usu-
ally, herald an imminent shift away from the lex loci, in Nevada's case it
seems to have encouraged the court to begin performing a substan-
tial-relationship analysis.
The court reaffirmed the choice-of-law clause rule from Sievers-
substantial relation plus no violation of forum public policy-in sev-
eral cases throughout the 1980s,117 and then in 1990 applied that test
to a case involving a contract that lacked a choice-of-law clause. 108
The court then completely abandoned the place-of-making rule in
1993, citing Sievers for the proposition that Nevada uses the substan-
tial-relationship test generally for contracts-with or without a choice-
of-law clause.109 By this time, the court had begun citing, quoting,
and applying in detail the Second Restatement, including section 188
and other sections relevant to specific contract issues.110
In 1996, the court completed the exodus from the First Restate-
ment by abandoning the place-of-injury rule in favor of a lex loci-plus-
contacts-override system of its own devising.11 Thus, the Nevada
transformation provides some hope that the remaining First Restate-
ment states may one day give up the ghost. Because so many states use
a section 187-style rule for choice-of-law clauses, and because that rule
106. Id. at 273.
107. See, e.g., Daniels v. National Home Life Assurance Co., 747 P.2d 897, 899 (Nev.
1987) (relying on Sievers in refusing to enforce a choice-of-law provision in an insurance
contract on grounds that it violated the public policy of the forum state); Engel v. Ernst,
724 P.2d 215, 217 (Nev. 1986) (applying Sievers to enforce a choice-of-law provision in a
partnership agreement because the chosen state had a substantial relationship to the trans-
action and the agreement did not violate public policy); Costanzo v. Marine Midland Re-
alty Credit Corp., 701 P.2d 747, 748 (Nev. 1985) (relying on Sievers to enforce the choice-
of-law provision in a promissory note because the chosen state had a substantial relation-
ship to the transaction and the transaction was not motivated by bad faith).
108. See Sotirakis v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 787 P.2d 788, 789-90 (Nev. 1990).
109. See Williams v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 849 P.2d 265, 266 (Nev. 1993).
110. See, e.g., id. at 267 (noting that, under § 193 of the Second Restatement, the location of
the insured risk is a significant factor in determining choice of law); Sotirakis, 787 P.2d at
791 (citing with approval § 193 of the Second Restatement).
111. See Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc., 921 P.2d 933 (Nev. 1996). The court stated:
Under this approach, the law of the forum (the place where the action is
brought) governs in a tort case, unless another state has an overwhelming inter-
est. Another state has an overwhelming interest if two or more of the following
factors are met:
(a) it is the place where the conduct giving rise to the injury occurred;
(b) it is the place where the injury is suffered;
(c) the parties have the same domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion, or place of business and it is different from the forum state;
(d) it is the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
Id. at 935.
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requires a contacts analysis, they, like Nevada, may acquire the habit
of analyzing contacts in contract cases and gradually extend that prac-
tice to other types of cases.
B. Deviations
The number of states that adhere, in one form or another, to the
First Restatement clearly overstates the traditional system's influence,
because even hard-core traditionalist courts tend to deviate from it on
several choice-of-law issues.
1. Party Autonomy. -According to Beale, party autonomy was in-
consistent with the territorialist vested rights approach:
The fundamental objection to this in point of theory is that it
involves permission to the parties to do a legislative act. It
practically creates a legislative body from any two persons
who choose to get together and contract.'12
Consequently, the First Restatement contained no provision permit-
ting the parties to stipulate the law that would govern their agree-
ment. One might expect, therefore, to find a lack of support for party
autonomy in contemporary First Restatement courts, but in fact, the op-
posite is the case. Contemporary First Restatement courts routinely en-
force choice-of-law clauses and routinely endorse the principle of
party autonomy.'
Research revealed over thirty opinions treating contracts with
choice-of-law clauses, and not one adopted Beale's position of princi-
pled opposition. Indeed, all but two contain language explicitly ap-
proving party autonomy in principle, regardless of whether they
enforce the particular choice-of-law clause before the court. 14 Thus,
112. 2 BFA1 , supra note 11, at 1079-80. Beale's view earned some respectable intellec-
tual support, including that of Learned Hand. See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48
F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931) (noting that laws and not parties impose the obligation of
transforming an agreement into a contract).
113. See infra notes 116-120 and cases cited therein.
114. The two exceptions are Schick v. Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464 (S.D. 1987), and Equi-
lease Corp. v. Belk Hotel Corp., 256 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. App. 1979). There is no reason to
suspect, however, that either state is generally hostile to party autonomy. Both cases in-
volved strong public policy considerations, and the court's decision to ignore a choice-of-
law clause in such circumstances is consistent with modem party autonomy rules. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). Schick involved a release, and
at the time, South Dakota treated the validity and effect of a release as a tort question and
consequently applied the law of the place of injury. The court has since switched to the
Second Restatement. See Stockmen's Livestock Exch. v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 255 (S.D.
1994) (applying the Second Restatement's approach to conflicts between principals and third
parties); Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63 (S.D. 1992) (adopting the
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it is fair.to conclude that every contemporary First Restatement state to-
day approves the principle of party autonomy. This development
makes sense, considering the reasons the courts give for adhering to
the traditional system generally. Few courts still rely on the vested
rights theory or territorialism, choosing instead to remain with the
First Restatement because of its predictability, certainty, and ease of ap-
plication.' 15 Those very reasons, however, also push courts toward
embracing party autonomy in spite of its theoretical inconsistency
with vested rights.
Most courts dealing with party autonomy cite, quote, and care-
fully apply the provisions of section 187 of the Second Restatement.
16
Others use the Restatement test, but do not cite section 187, allowing
the reader to believe that the court came to the position on its own. 117
In addition, there are courts that cite very old cases, suggesting that
party autonomy was alive and well even in Beale's time."18
The strong tendency among the courts is to enforce the choice-
of-law clause, especially when it calls for the law of the forum.' 1 9 Nev-
Second Restatement's significant-relationship approach for multistate tort actions). There is
ample reason to believe that South Dakota would generally enforce choice-of-law clauses.
See Husky Spray Serv. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146, 150 (S.D. 1991) (accepting the trial court's
application of North Dakota law to the contract as provided for in the choice-of-law
clause).
Equilease involved a usury issue in which the loan was secured by North Carolina real
estate. North Carolina generally enforces choice-of-law clauses. See, e.g., A.E.P. Indus.,
Inc., v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760 (1983) (holding that North Carolina will give effect
to a contractual provision that a given jurisdiction's substantive law will govern contract
interpretation).
115. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Elgar v. Elgar, 679 A.2d 937, 942 (Conn. 1996); Carr v. Kupfer, 296 S.E.2d
560, 562 (Ga. 1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698, 703
(Mich. 1995); Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896 P.2d 1230, 1234 (Utah 1995); Prows v. Pinpoint
Retail Sys., Inc. 868 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1993); Al Baraka Bancorp, Inc. v. Hilweh, 656
A.2d 197, 200 (Vt. 1995); Resource Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 975
(Wyo. 1996).
117. See, e.g., Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Cates, 810 P.2d 1154, 1159 (Kan. 1991);
Daniels v. National Home Life Ins., 747 P.2d 897, 899 (Nev. 1987).
118. See, e.g., Paul Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.SA, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Va. 1990)
(citing Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 26 S.E. 421, 422 (Va. 1896)).
119. See, e.g., Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telecom Inc., 912 F.
Supp. 469, 473-74 (D. Kan. 1995); Chrysler Corp., 528 N.W.2d at 702); Telex Corp. v. Hamil-
ton, 576 P.2d 767, 768 (Okla. 1978). In most cases, the courts were also willing to enforce
clauses choosing nonforum law. See, e.g., Atchinson Casting Corp. v. DoFasco, Inc., 889 F.
Supp. 1445 (D. Kan. 1995) (Ontario law); Arkansas Appliance Distrib. Co. v. Tandy Elecs.,
Inc., 730 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. 1987) (Texas law); Elgar v. Elgar, 679 A.2d 967 (Conn. 1996)
(New York law); Carr v. Kupfer, 296 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1982) (Maryland law); Mark Twain
Kansas City Bank v. Cates, 810 P.2d 1154 (Kan. 1991) (Missouri law); Engel v. Ernst, 724
P.2d 215 (Nev. 1986) (Colorado law); Contanzo v. Marine Midland Realty Credit, 701 P.2d
747 (Nev. 1985) (New York law); Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co. v. Diversified
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ertheless, about one-third of the cases invalidated the choice-of-law
clause, mostly because the chosen law violated the forum's public pol-
icy.1 20 Thus, the tendency to validate the clause, while strong, does
not seem to be as reliable among the traditionalist courts as it is in
American courts generally. 12
1
2. Usuy.-Seven states have shown a willingness to depart from
the standard lex loci rules in usury cases. The most emphatic are from
Tennessee, Arkansas, and Florida, where courts have announced an
explicit validation principle. Its clearest statement appears in Goodwin
Brothers Leasing, Inc. v. H & B, Inc.:'22
Tennessee, like many other states, has long recognized a
choice of law principle unique in usury cases that parties are
presumed to have chosen that law which will uphold the le-
gality of their bargain. That law which will lend greatest va-
lidity to the transaction will be applied if it is otherwise
logically relevant.12
Mortgage Investors, 603 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1979) (Massachusetts law); United Wholesale Li-
quor Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 775 P.2d 233 (N.M. 1989) (Kentucky law);
A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1983) (NewJersey law); Tennessee
Carolina Transp., Inc., 196 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1973) (Pennsylvania law); Husky Spray Serv.,
Inc. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146 (S.D. 1991) (N. Dakota law); Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896
P.2d 1230 (Utah 1995) (Nevada law); Al Baraka Bancorp, Inc. v. Hilweh, 656 A.2d 197 (Vt.
1994) (Illinois law); Resource Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972 (Wyo.
1996) (Pennsylvania law).
120. See, e.g., Henson v. GTE Prods. Corp., No. 93-1862, 1994 WL 470161 at *2 (4th Cir.
Sept. 1, 1994) (holding Massachusetts law of punitive damages violates South Carolina pub-
lic policy); Moore v. Subaru of Am., 891 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding
Indiana insurance law violates Oklahoma public policy); Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v.
Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1991) (holding North Carolina law violates Alabama
public policy); National Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., 650 A.2d 246, 249-50
(Md. 1994) (holding Pennsylvania law on mechanics lien waiver violates Maryland public
policy); Martino v. Cottman Transmission Sys., 554 N.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Mich. 1996) (hold-
ing Pennsylvania franchise law violates Michigan public policy); Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886
P.2d 931, 935 (Mont. 1994) (holding Connecticut franchise law violates Montana public
policy); Youngblood v. American States Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 203, 205 (Mont. 1993) (holding
Oregon subrogation law violates Montana public policy); Daniels v. National Home Life
Assurance Co., 747 P.2d 897, 899 (Nev. 1987) (holding Missouri insurance law violates
public policy of Nevada); Schick v. Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464, 469 (S.D. 1987) (holding
Illinois law on release of insurer violates South Dakota public policy); Prows v. Pinpoint
Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1994) (concluding holding New York has "no
substantial relationship" to the parties or transaction).
121. See Symeonides, supra note 67, at 54-74 (surveying 1994 choice-of-law clause deci-
sions); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Develop-
ments, 39 AM. J. CoMp. L. 465, 480-86 (1991).
122. 597 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1980).
123. Id. at 308. To the same effect is Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City
Bank & Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981). The court stated:
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Other states' courts, although not as explicitly, have made their
views on usury relatively clear by refusing to invoke public policy to
invalidate a choice-of-law clause, 124 or by refusing to invalidate a usuri-
ous contract unless it was both made and intended to be performed in
the forum, or by sympathetically citing pro-validation authorities. 12
5
One state, by contrast, deviates from the place-of-contracting rule
with an anti-validation principle for some usury cases. In North Caro-
lina, the courts consistently invalidate loans, although legal where
made, if they exceed the maximum North Carolina rate and are se-
cured by North Carolina property. 126
3. Workers' Compensation. -Traditionalist courts routinely deviate
from the lex loci rules in workers' compensation cases.1 2 7 That should
not come as too great a surprise, because the First Restatement itself is
uncharacteristically flexible in this area. 128
Georgia appears to be the only state that still adheres to the
place-of-injury rule. In Sargent Industries, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,129
the plaintiff, an Iowa resident, employed by Delta Air Lines, Inc.
(Delta) as a flight attendant in Illinois, was injured in Georgia on an
emergency evacuation slide manufactured by Sargent Industries, Inc.
In a situation where, under the law of one state with a relation to the transaction,
it is void, while under the law of the other state with a relation, the interest is
forfeited but principal is an enforceable debt, the law construes the parties' intent
to be that the latter law should apply. The law that partly invalidates the transac-
tion is preferred over the law that wholly invalidates it, where both states have a
normal and reasonable relation to the transaction.
Id. at 1063; see also Arkansas Appliance Distrib. Co. v. Tandy Elecs., Inc., 730 S.W.2d 899,
900 (Ark. 1987) ("This [c]ourt has, moreover, consistently inclined toward applying the
law of the state that will make the contract valid, rather than void." (citations omitted)).
124. See, e.g., Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors,
603 P.2d 270, 273-74 (1979) ("We are under no compulsion ... to abrogate rights of
parties contracting beyond the state's jurisdiction, having little or no relation to anything
done or to be done within Nevada."). But see General Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289,
294 (W. Va. 1981) (invalidating a choice-of-law clause in a usurious contract).
125. See Kronovet v. Lipchin, 415 A.2d 1096, 1104-05 (Md. 1980) (citing § 187(a) of the
Second Restatement as authority).
126. See Equilease Corp. v. Belk Hotel Corp., 256 S.E.2d 836, 839-40 (N.C. App. 1979)
(and cases cited therein).
127. Many choice-of-law issues in workers' compensation cases are governed by statute,
but enough issues remain to generate a fair number of decisions in the survey period.
Three types of issues predominate: (1) coverage of the state statute (some provide for
higher benefits than others); (2) employer's immunity from tort suit; and (3) third party's
immunity from tort suit. For a complete discussion of these and other workers' compensa-
tion conflicts issues, see 3 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, ch.
XVI (1997).
128. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 398-399 (1934) (permitting recovery if the
statute of either the state of injury or the state of the employment contract permits it).
129. 303 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 1983).
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(Sargent). 3 ' After receiving an Illinois workers' compensation award,
she sued Sargent in Georgia.1 31 Sargent sought to implead Delta, a
procedure permitted by Illinois's workers' compensation law, but not
Georgia's.t1 2 With little discussion, the Supreme Court of Georgia ap-
plied the traditional place-of-injury rule for tort cases and chose Geor-
gia law. 133
Other traditionalist states reject the lex loci rules in workers' com-
pensation cases, instead employing either a balancing-of-interests13 1
or center-of-gravity approach. 135  Regardless of the description of
their methods, the courts seem willing to apply the law of the forum as
long as there is some reasonable connection with the dispute.
Once a court begins balancing interests or weighing contacts, the
process can become infectious. Connecticut courts abandoned the
place-of-injury rule in workers' compensation cases, which eventually
led to the adoption of modern methods for tort cases generally. In
Simaitis v. F/ood,13 6 the Supreme Court of Connecticut relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co.137 and the Second Restatement to adopt a modern approach for
compensation cases. 138 Six years later, it relied heavily on Simaitis in
definitively abandoning the place-of-injury rule in O'Connor v.
O'Connor.'1
9
4. Uniform Commercial Code.-The U.C.C. has its own choice-of-
law provisions. Chief among them is section 1-105, which provides for
party autonomy and, in the absence of a choice-of-law clause, for the
law of the forum, provided that the transaction bears "an appropriate
130. Id. at 109.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 110; see also Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Glomski, 437 S.E.2d 616, 617 (Ga. 1993)
(holding that Georgia's place-of-injury rule governs insurer's subrogation rights even
though employee received workers' compensation in Illinois).
134. See, e.g., Bishop v. Twiford, 562 A.2d 1238, 1240 (Md. 1989) (applying Maryland
workers' compensation statute when employer had substantial business activity in Mary-
land, injury occurred in Maryland, and action was against a Maryland resident).
135. See, e.g., Bryant v. O.T. Seward, 490 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tenn. 1973) (applying Ten-
nessee workers' compensation statute when state had legitimate interest in the controversy,
and there was a substantial connection between Tennessee and the employer-employee
relationship).
136. 437 A.2d 828 (Conn. 1980).
137. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
138. Simaitis, 437 A.2d at 832.
139. 519 A.2d 13, 15-16 (Conn. 1986).
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relation" to the forum. 4 ° By and large, contemporary First Restatement
courts displace the usual lex loci rules and faithfully apply the Code's
provisions in U.C.C. cases."' The issue then shifts to the construction
of the phrase "an appropriate relation." Most opinions use some
modern choice-of-law methodology to interpret the phrase and often
equate it with the Second Restatement's most-significant-relationship
formula.
142
In these courts, the U.C.C. and its modem choice-of-law provi-
sions exist side-by-side with the lex loci rules and often produce some
interesting opinions. In product liability cases, for instance, it is not
unusual to see the courts rigidly apply the law of the place of injury to
the strict liability count and then slide into a fully modern analysis of
the most significant relationship for choosing the law governing the
implied warranty count.14
Not all contemporary First Restatement courts have made their
peace with the U.C.C., however. In Virginia, for example, a federal
court opined that the state's adoption of section 1-105 was not "in-
tended to reject or supersede previously established choice-of-law
rules in Virginia" and thus read the appropriate-relation formula to
do little more than codify the lex loci rules.14 4 A Georgia federal court
went one better and simply ignored section 1-105, instead applying
the place-of-injury rule to both the strict liability and warranty counts
in a product liability case. 145
C. The Dismal Part of the Landfill 46
1. False Conflicts and Worse.-The good news is the lex loci rules
are steadily decreasing in popularity, and even committed First Restate-
140. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1994); see also id. § 9-103 (delineating choice-
of-law rules for perfection of security interests).
141. See, e.g., Collins Radio Co. v. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Okla. App. 1980) (applying
U.C.C. choice-of-law rule in determining the validity of a sales contract).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971); see, e.g., Collins Radio,
623 P.2d at 1046 (applying the most-significant-relationship test to U.C.C. Article 2 ac-
tions). In Arkansas, the court of appeals determined the appropriate-relation issue by ref-
erence to Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, under the influence, no doubt, of the
Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption of that test for tort cases in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie
Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 456-57 (Ark. 1977) (in banc).
143. See, e.g., Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 886 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1989); Boudreau v.
Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988).
144. Madaus v. November Hill Farm, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (W.D. Va. 1986).
145. See Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438, 442 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
146. Note the substitution of "landfill" for the more traditional "swamp." Now that we
know that wetlands are important for flood control and provide crucial habitat for wildlife,
it seems politically incorrect to use "swamp" as a pejorative for abysmal choice-of-law
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ment courts have deviated from the lex loci rules on several issues. 147
The bad news, however, is contemporary First Restatement courts still
mechanically apply the law of the disinterested state in false conflicts
and still use recharacterization, renvoi, and public policy as escape de-
vices to produce palatable results but unprincipled opinions.
Alabama leads the league in mechanical decisions in false con-
flicts cases. Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. 4 ' is an im-
pressive, recent example.'49 After an Alabama family was killed in a
Florida plane crash, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action
against two non-Florida defendants-the manufacturer of the plane
and the manufacturer of a flight instrument. In a well-researched
opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to adopt modern
choice-of-law methods and, instead, applied the trusty place-of-injury
rule.1 50 As a result, Florida rather than Alabama law applied, and the
court limited compensatory damages for the death of the wife and
children to funeral expenses, because they had no income. 151
Even more wooden is an Alabama federal court's decision in
Thomas v. FMC Corp.152 Almost two years after her husband was killed
in Germany by a defective Howitzer, manufactured in part by General
Motors Corporation, the Alabama plaintiff added General Motors
Corporation as a defendant in her existing action against FMC. Both
Alabama and Germany had wrongful death limitations periods of two
years or longer, but Alabama had a one-year limitation period for torts
generally. The court held that the substantive law of Germany applied
and that Alabama's two-year wrongful death limitations period ap-
decisions. I suggest that the conflict of laws section formally retire the swamp metaphor.
My suggestion for a replacement is "landfill," but "sinkhole" is always popular.
147. See supra Part I.A.3.
148. 581 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1991).
149. See also Powell v. Sappington, 495 So. 2d 569, 570 (Ala. 1986) (applying place-of-
injury rule to choose Georgia workers' compensation law even though employee and em-
ployer were Alabamans); Norris v. Taylor, 460 So. 2d 151, 152 (Ala. 1984) (using place-of-
injury rule to select Kentucky law for negligence action even though employee and co-
employees were Alabamans and act of negligence occurred in Alabama). Although Ala-
bama leads the league in false conflicts, it has not cornered the market. See, e.g., Jacobs v.
Adams, 505 A.2d 930, 936 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (using place-of-injury rule to choose
no-fault insurance law of the District of Columbia to prohibit negligence action by Mary-
land plaintiff against Maryland defendant). Somewhat personally embarrassing is the Ja-
cobs court's prominent citation of RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 116, for the
proposition that there would be no reason to consider D.C.'s no-fault law to be procedural,
en route to its refusal to use the recharacterization escape device. SeeJacobs, 505 A.2d at
936.
150. Fitts, 581 So. 2d at 823.
151. Id. at 820 n.l.
152. 610 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
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plied only to actions brought under the Alabama wrongful death stat-
ute, not those brought under the German statute.153  The court
refused to apply Germany's three-year limitations statute because it
was not specific enough to be considered a "substantive" limitations
provision. 154 Rather, the court applied Alabama's one-year residual
statute of limitations for torts generally and barred the plaintiff's
claim, even though the common policy of Alabama and Germany was
to allow at least two years to bring a wrongful death action.155
2. Escape.--The standard First Restatement maneuver to avoid the
system's most egregious results is to employ one of the many escape
devices. Contemporary First Restatement courts do so as willingly as did
their predecessors before the conflicts revolution.
a. Rule Manipulation. -Surprisingly, traditionalist courts
rarely quote or cite in detail the specific provisions of the First Restate-
ment, apparently, they are content with general statements of the lex
loci rules.156 A notable exception is Wittkowski v. Corrections Depart-
ment,"'57 in which the Court of Appeals of New Mexico relied on a
detailed analysis using the Restatement's tort provisions to avoid an un-
palatable result.' The plaintiffs' case against the New Mexico De-
partment of Corrections alleged that prison employees were negligent
in failing to prevent the escape of two inmates, who then killed the
husband of one of the plaintiffs in a robbery in Colorado.' 59 Because
153. Id. at 914.
154. Id. at 915. The court acknowledged that Alabama used a particularly "stringent
version of the aforesaid specifics test." Id.
155. Id. at 916. In the strikingly similar case, Jones v. R.S. Jones & Associates, Inc., 431
S.E.2d 33 (Va. 1993), the Supreme Court of Virginia used the specificity exception to avoid
the dysfunctional result. Almost two years after her husband died in an airplane crash in
Florida, a Virginia widow brought a wrongful death action against the owner of the air-
plane and the firm that maintained it. Id. at 33. As in Thomas, Virginia had a two-year
statute for wrongful death claims and a one-year "catch all" statute. Id. at 33-34. The Jones
court held that Florida's two-year wrongful death statute was sufficiently specific to be sub-
stantive and applied it to save the plaintiff's claim from Virginia's one-year "catch all" stat-
ute. Id. at 35. Apparently the court could not have applied Virginia's two-year wrongful
death statute for reasons analogous to those relied on in Thomas. Id. at 35-36.
156. But see Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 606 A.2d 295, 301-05 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992) (quoting extensively and discussing § 412 of the First Restatement, which
states that "the measure of damages for a tort is determined by the law of the place of
wrong"). Apparently, Second Restatement courts are no more likely to quote specific sec-
tions. See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations
and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1241-47 (1997).
157. 710 P.2d 93 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
158. Id. at 95-96.
159. Id. at 94-95.
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of New Mexico's adherence to the place-of-injury rule,16° the court
faced the possibility that Colorado's negligence law might determine
the appropriate standard of care for New Mexico prison administra-
tors.16 The court avoided that result by relying on section 380(2) of
the First Restatement,162 which creates an exception to the place-of-in-
jury rule. Section 380(2) directs the court to apply the law of the
place of the defendant's conduct when the standard for that conduct
"has been defined in particular situations by statute or judicial
decision. '"63
Usually, however, rule manipulation is accomplished by other
means. In North Carolina insurance cases, it is based on a statute
which provides that all contracts insuring risks in North Carolina
"shall be deemed to be made therein," thus using the place-of-making
rule to accomplish the same result that the Second Restatement accom-
plishes in section 193.1" The most typical method of rule manipula-
tion is justified neither by the First Restatement nor by special statute,
but only by its result. In Trahan v. E.R Squibb & Sons,'65 a product
liability case, the plaintiff suffered injuries in Tennessee while giving
birth, and she attributed her difficulties to her mother's ingestion of
diethylstilbestrol (DES) in North Carolina.166 Had the federal court
read the place-of-injury rule to refer to North Carolina law, the plain-
tiff would have lost her strict liability claim on summary judgment.
Instead, the court determined that the place of injury was not North
Carolina, where the drug first had its effect on plaintiff and her
mother, but Tennessee, where the injury was first discovered.' 67
b. Recharacterization.--Characterization is as crucial for to-
day's traditionalist courts as it always has been." 68 Indeed, the more
complex choice-of-law practice of contemporary First Restatement
courts may have increased the importance of characterization. In di-
160. Id. at 95.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 95-96.
163. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICG OF LAws § 380(2) (1934).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-1 (1996). This statute is applied in Martin v. Continental
Insurance Co., 474 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), in which the court held that North
Carolina law would apply to contracts issued in Kansas. Id. at 148-49.
165. 567 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). Tennessee did not abandon the place-of-
injury rule until 1992. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
166. Trahan, 567 F. Supp. at 506-07.
167. This result possibly may be justified under section 377 illustration 2 of the First
Restatement, but the court did not cite this or any other provision of the First Restatement.
168. See RicHmAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 138-39.
1997] 1221
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
vided loyalty states, 169 characterization does more than drive choice-
of-law results; it also controls choice-of-law methodology, because in
those states a contract characterization calls for the law of the place of
contracting, whereas a tort characterization requires analysis under
one of the modern approaches.
170
Borrowing statutes also can emphasize the importance of charac-
terization. In Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. August,171 the plain-
tiff, while covered by an auto insurance policy issued in Massachusetts,
was injured in a Florida automobile accident involving an uninsured
motorist. 172 Almost five years after the accident, the policyholder
sued the insurance company in Florida, and the lower courts, treating
the case as a Florida tort, applied Florida's five-year statute of limita-
tions. 17' The Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision, stating
that under a contract characterization the claim arose in Massachu-
setts. 174 That determination required the court to apply Florida's bor-
rowing statute, which in turn called for the application of
Massachusetts's three-year statute of limitations, thus barring the
plaintiff's claim. 1
71
Considering the importance of characterization, it is not surpris-
ing that contemporary First Restatement courts still use it as an escape
device. The case of Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.176 is a textbook exam-
ple. The plaintiff, an Oregonian, sued a Connecticut firearms manu-
facturer in a federal court in Connecticut.1 77 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was liable for the plaintiffs son's injuries, which
were caused by the accidental discharge of a gun manufactured by the
defendant. 17' Eventually, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Connecticut the
question whether Oregon's eight-year 179 statute of repose barred the
169. See supra Part II.A.3.
170. The dichotomy is most apparent in product liability claims in which the strict liabil-
ity tort count is referred to the law of the place of injury and the implied warranty count is
analyzed via the appropriate-relation standard. See, e.g., Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
886 F.2d 85, 89 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that South Carolina conflicts law required the
place-of-injury test for the tort count and the most-significant-relationship test for the war-
ranty count).
171. 530 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1988).
172. Id. at 294.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 296.
175. Id.
176. 644 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1994).
177. Id. at 1297-98.
178. Id.
179. The time period is measured from the date the product was first purchased or
consumed. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1988).
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plaintiff's claim."' ° Apparendy, the Connecticut court's views on gun
control and product liability differed from those of the Oregon legis-
lature, because the court, ignoring substantial authority on the ques-
tion, recharacterized the issue of repose from tort to procedure and
applied the law of Connecticut, which included no statute of re-
pose.18 1 In effect, the court rewarded the plaintiff for his clever forum
shopping and sent a powerful message of deterrence to Connecticut's
firearms industry. 182
Baxter, however, is small potatoes compared to a series of cases in
West Virginia and Virginia. By statute in West Virginia, an insurer
need not pay uninsured motorist benefits to an insured whose dam-
ages are caused by a hit-and-run driver unless there is physical contact
between the two vehicles.18 3 Apparently, the purpose of the statute is
to avoid fraudulent claims involving "phantom" hit-and-run drivers
fabricated by insureds who have been involved in ordinary one-car ac-
cidents.1 84 The adjacent states do not have similar statutes.1 8 5 The
courts of both West Virginia and Virginia are quite unsympathetic to
the statute and have struggled mightily to avoid its application in con-
flicts cases.' 86
In Perkins v. Doe,"s7 the first case in the series, the insureds were
West Virginia residents who were involved in a Virginia accident.18
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the case
sounded in tort and applied the law of Virginia, thereby permitting
recovery.1 9 Two years later, in Lee v. Saliga,19° the court dropped the
other shoe. The insured was a resident of Pennsylvania who was in-
volved in an accident in West Virginia. 9 ' After a half-hearted attempt
180. Baxter, 644 A.2d at 1299.
181. See id. at 1302 ("The certified question asked: 'Is a statute of repose, such as Ore-
gon Revised Statutes § 30.905(1), properly considered substantive for choice of law pur-
poses under Connecticut law?' Our answer is: No.").
182. Id. Another example is Maxfield v. Estate of Maxfield, No. CA 87-373, 1988 WL
30197, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988), in which the court recharacterized the issue
from real property to contract in order to validate a contract that otherwise would be held
usurious.
183. SeeW. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(e)(iii) (1996).
184. See Perkins v. Doe, 350 S.E.2d 711, 714 n.4 (W. Va. 1986).
185. See id. at 713.
186. See id. at 714-15.
187. 350 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1986).
188. Id. at 712-13.
189. Id. at 715.
190. 373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988).
191. Id. at 347.
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to distinguish Perkins,92 the court held the issue to be one of contract
and applied the law of Pennsylvania-the place the contract was
made-again permitting recovery. 19 3 Quod Erat Faciendum!
As yet, the Supreme Court of Virginia has had no opportunity to
make inconsistent characterizations, having decided only one case on
the matter. In Buchanan v. Doe,'94 the insured, a Virginian, was forced
off the road in West Virginia by a truck; the driver stopped, but did
not identify himself.19 5 Not surprisingly, the court applied a contract
characterization and, therefore, the recovery-generating law of
Virginia.19 6
D. Renvoi
Mercifully, renvoi opinions are rare, as its value to the court as an
escape device is often outweighed by the difficulty of comprehending
and applying the doctrine. 19 7 Nevertheless, traditionalist courts occa-
sionally used renvoi as an escape device in the years before the con-
flicts revolution.19 8  Since then, renvoi decisions are even less
192. Id. at 349. The opinion suggests a distinction based on the circumstance that Per-
kins was a certified question case referred to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia by the federal district court. Id. According to the opinion in Saliga, the federal
court's certified question in Perkins called for the West Virginia court's solution to the tort
conflict-of-law issue. Id. In fact, the question is ambiguous, and it is not readily apparent
why the form of the question is a distinction worth a difference.
193. Id. at 352. West Virginia's rule for insurance contracts is in fact a bit more sophisti-
cated than the typical place-of-making rule. It calls for the "law of the state where the
policy was issued and the risk was principally located, unless another state has a more
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties." Id. at 353. Compare RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 193 (1971):
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and rights created
thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties understood
was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy,
unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties,
in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
Id.
194. 431 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 1993). This series of cases is reminiscent of the famed Arkan-
sas telegraph cases described originally by Professor Leflar. See LEFLAR ET AL, supra note 18,
at 258. The Arkansas courts, in order to apply Arkansas law permitting emotional damages
for misdelivered telegraph messages, characterized the issue as a contract when the
message was sent from Arkansas and a tort when the message was received in Arkansas.
For a description of the telegraph cases, see VERNON ET AL., supra note 20, at 257-58.
195. Buchanan, 431 S.E.2d at 290.
196. Id. at 292.
197. For a good explanation of renvoi, see American Motorists Insurance Co. v. ARTRA
Group, Inc., 659 A.2d 1295, 1301-03 (Md. 1995).
198. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. Dater, 270 N.W. 175, 176 (Mich. 1936) (using
renvoi in a contract case to escape Michigan's place-of-making rule); In re Schneider's Es-
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common. 9 9 Occasionally, a court will throw in renvoi as an after-
thought to recharacterization and public policy as one more reason to
refuse to apply the standard lex loci rules.20 0
One recent case from a First Restatement court, however, uses
renvoi much more significantly. This case, American Motorists Insurance
Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc.,211 decided by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, has been discussed illuminatingly and at length by Professor
Symeonides, and thus warrants only summary treatment here.
The issue in ARTRA was whether ARTRA's insurance policy with
American Motorists Insurance Co. (American Motorists) required the
insurer to indemnify and defend ARTRA in a suit by Sherwin-Wil-
liams, which had purchased a paint factory from ARTRA. °2 The
Maryland Department of the Environment had required Sherwin-Wil-
liams to remedy hazardous waste contamination of soil and ground
water at the site, and Sherwin-Williams sued ARTRA in federal court
in Maryland seeking reimbursement for its cleanup expenses.203
When American Motorists refused to defend the action, ARTRA sued
the insurer in Maryland state court.20 4
When the case arrived at the court of appeals, the issue was
whether to interpret the contract under the law of Illinois or Mary-
land.205 Under Illinois law, the issue of coverage was ambiguous, but
under Maryland law, the policy clearly did not cover ARTRA's loss. 20
6
First, the court of appeals reaffirmed its adherence to the place-of-
making rule.2 7 Although it had used selected provisions of the Second
Restatement on occasion, it did not need to abandon the place-of-mak-
ing rule to decide the case. 20 8
Instead, the court announced "a limited renvoi exception" to the
rule:
tate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, 657-60 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (using renvoi to escape law-of-the-situs rule in
a case of a will involving proceeds from Swiss land).
199. Occasionally, courts will toy with the concept but not apply it because the forum
and the foreign state both use the same choice-of-law rule. See, e.g., Eichel v. Goode, Inc.,
680 P.2d 627, 631-32 (N.M. App. 1984). In those circumstances, renvoi does not produce
an escape.
200. See, e.g., Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 914, 917 (N.C. 1991).
201. 659 A-2d 1295 (Md. 1995).
202. Id. at 1297.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1297-98.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Under this exception, Maryland courts should apply Mary-
land substantive law to contracts entered into in foreign
states' jurisdictions in spite of the doctrine of lex loci contrac-
tus when:
1) Maryland has the most significant relationship, or, at
least, a substantial relationship with respect to the contract
issue presented; and
2) The state where the contract was entered into would
not apply its own substantive law, but instead would apply
Maryland substantive law to the issue before the court.20 9
The exception worked to escape the place-of-making rule, because Illi-
nois used the most-significant-relationship test of the Second Restate-
ment, and under sections 188 and 193, an Illinois court would have
applied the law of Maryland (the state where the insured risk was lo-
cated) to interpret the contract.210
In light of Professor Symeonides's complete discussion of the
case, 2 1 1 only a few comments are warranted here. First, the court
never considered the First Restatement's provisions on renvoi, which
makes sense because they would not have permitted the use of renvoi
in ARTRA; 2 12 nor did the court address the Second Restatement's renvoi
provisions, although they might have justified using the concept in
ARTRA.213
Second, the court expended a great deal of effort to travel a very
short distance. All that it really accomplished with its extensive discus-
sion of renvoi is the application in an insurance case of the law of the
state where the risk was located. The court reached that result by ap-
plying Illinois choice-of-law rules, including Second Restatement sections
188 and 193, but it could have reached the same result simply by
adopting section 193 as a special Maryland choice-of-law rule for in-
surance cases. This is a maneuver that several other lex loci courts have
adopted. 214 Its price in terms of Maryland choice-of-law precedent-
209. Id. at 1304.
210. Id. at 1298-99.
211. See Symeonides, supra note 67, at 182-86.
212. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1934) (permitting renvoi only in cases in-
volving land titles and validity of divorce decrees).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8(2) (1971) (permitting reference
to a foreign state's choice-of-law rule as a way of measuring that state's level of interest in
the controversy).
214. See, e.g., Vandiver Food Stores, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 909 F. Supp. 618,
620 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (relying on the Second Restatement for the conclusion that Arkansas law
should govern an insurance dispute); Nadler v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 424 S.E.2d 256,
264 (W. Va. 1992) (relying on the Second Restatement for the conclusion that Ohio law
should govern an insurance dispute).
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carving a small hole in the place-of-making rule-would have been
small compared to the adoption of a broad renvoi provision that could
apply in a wide range of contract cases.
Finally, the use of renvoi in ARTRA inevitably will involve the
Maryland courts in the application of the most-significant-relationship
test. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted already that Mary-
land's flexibility in contract choice-of-law jurisprudence has increased
in recent years. 215 Given that momentum, additional experience with
the most-significant-relationship test required by ARTRA's renvoi rule
may be all that Maryland needs to abandon the lex loci rule in favor of
the Second Restatement. In other words, Maryland may "ease" into the
Second Restatement via the new renvoi rule,just as other states have done
via choice-of-law clauses, the U.C.C., and the special workers' compen-
sation choice-of-law rules.
E. Public Policy
Public policy was the ultimate escape device before the choice-of-
law revolution. Traditionalist courts were willing to override their
own lex loci rules when those rules called for the application of foreign
law that violated the forum's public policy.216 Use of the device by lex
loci courts continues today;217 indeed, it is one of the most frequently
litigated choice-of-law issues,218 often representing the last hope of the
losing litigant.
Standards for the application of the doctrine vary widely. Most
opinions indicate that it is not enough that the foreign law is different
from that of the forum.219 Rather, the foreign law "must violate some
prevalent conception of good morals or fundamental principle of nat-
ural justice or involve injustice to the people of the forum state. "220
215. ARTRA, 659 A.2d at 1305.
216. Perhaps the most well-known applications are New York's in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918), in which the court held that Massachusetts's wrongful
death damage limitation was not sufficiently odious to violate New York's public policy,
and Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961), in which the court
held that the same Massachusetts law did violate New York's policy.
217. Both Restatements contain provisions permitting the use of the doctrine. See RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLrCr OF LAwS § 612 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 90 (1971).
218. See Rhee v. Combined Enters., Inc., 536 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
219. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 857 (N.C. 1988) (stating that "the
mere fact that the law of the forum differs from that of the other jurisdictions does not
mean that the foreign statute is contrary to the public policy of the forum").
220. Id.; see also Alexander v. General Motors Corp., 466 S.E.2d 607, 609 (Ga. 1995)
(ruling that the public policy exception is justified when foreign law "contravenes our es-
tablished public policy, or the recognized standards of civilization and good morals").
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Other opinions are considerably more cavalier, providing no discus-
sion of standards at all.22 '
It is impossible to predict which issues will prompt a court to use
the public policy escape. Surprisingly, courts in both Tennessee and
Georgia, for instance, held that the failure to adopt strict liability in
tort by the state in which the injury occurred (relying instead on negli-
gence and warranty) was sufficiently crucial as to violate fundamental
forum public policy.2 22 Another oddity occurs in Maryland, where the
courts seem much more willing to use public policy to override the
place-of-contracting rule than the place-of-injury rule.2 Maryland
courts also suggest that the key variable may be whether the state legis-
lature has spoken on the particular public policy before the court.224
Further, some issues, such as gambling contracts, have generated dif-
ferent results in different states. 25 The only possible generalization is
that courts seem most willing to invalidate foreign contract law when
it permits a powerful party to overreach a weaker one.
From the point of view of progress in First Restatement states, the
most interesting development is the importation of modem choice-of-
law methods into the public policy discussion. Several opinions
clearly perform a center-of-gravity analysis in the guise of the tradi-
tional public policy exception. In Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Service,
Inc.,226 the plaintiff, a New Mexico worker, injured himself on the job
in New Mexico.2 27 Following surgery for the injury, he moved to Min-
nesota, where his recuperation progressed.22 ' Eventually, his em-
ployer's insurance company terminated his compensation benefits. 229
When the plaintiff objected, negotiations ensued, and in return for a
lump sum payment, the plaintiff signed a release in Minnesota, which
was valid according to that state's law, but not according to the law of
221. See, e.g., Wixom Bros. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 435 So. 2d 1231, 1233-34 (Ala. 1983)
(concluding that California law violated forum's public policy).
222. See Trahan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 505, 507 (M.D. Tenn. 1983);
Alexander v. General Motors Corp., 478 S.E.2d 123, 123-24 (Ga. 1996).
223. See Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 606 A.2d 295, 300 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (finding no modern Maryland cases that have invalidated foreign tort rules,
but several that have invalidated foreign contract rules).
224. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 498 A.2d 605, 608 (Md. 1985).
225. Compare Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 535 A.2d 466, 470 (Md. 1988) (holding
that a NewJersey gambling contract did not violate Maryland public policy), with Casanova
Club v. Bisharat, 458 A.2d 1, 2 (Conn. 1983) (holding that a British gambling contract
violated Connecticut public policy).
226. 646 P.2d 586 (N.M. 1982).
227. Id. at 588.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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New Mexico. 3 ° When the plaintiff returned to New Mexico and filed
a workers' compensation claim, the employer and the insurer pled the
release in defense.
231
Refusing to apply the place-of-making rule, and thus the law of
Minnesota, the court emphasized New Mexico's close contact with the
case, rather than the "evil" content of the Minnesota law:
In this case the plaintiff signed a release for a workmen's
compensation claim that arose entirely out of New Mexico
circumstances. The plaintiff was then a New Mexico resi-
dent, working in New Mexico, and was injured in New Mex-
ico. His initial treatment was also in New Mexico. To allow
Minnesota law to govern the release of plaintiff's rights
would conceivably deny plaintiff some of the important pro-
tections guaranteed by the two acts in question. The policies
of protection underlying the two acts require that New Mex-
ico law be applied to the workmen's compensation claim re-
lease in this case.21 2
In Braxton v. Anco Electric, Inc.,23 3 the North Carolina Supreme
Court's "public policy" discussion focused on the center of gravity, but
also included a classic interest analysis. 2 4 The plaintiff, a North Caro-
lina employee, brought a tort action against a third-party tortfeasor in
North Carolina after being injured at a Virginiajob site. 2 5 The law of
Virginia barred his claim, but the law of North Carolina did not.23 6
The court, refusing to apply the place-of-injury rule, reasoned that the
workers' compensation law of North Carolina had struck a bargain
among employees, employers, and third parties involving an exchange
of compensation of benefits and tort immunities. 2 7 The construction
of that bargain, entirely among North Carolinians, should occur
under the law of North Carolina-not Virginia.2"8 Thus, under the
230. Id.
231. Id. at 588-89.
232. Id, at 590; see also Johns v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. App.
1995). In Johns, the plaintiffs son negligently caused an auto accident in North Carolina
in which the plaintiff was injured. Id. at 467. The plaintiff, a Tennessee resident, sued her
insurer for underinsured motorists benefits. Id. The policy contained an intra-family ex-
clusion, valid under the law of Tennessee but not North Carolina. Id. at 468-69. The court
refused to apply the public policy exception to the place-of-making rule and relied in part
on a contacts analysis showing Tennessee, not North Carolina, to be the center of gravity,
thereby denying coverage. Id. at 469.
233. 409 S.E.2d 914 (N.C. 1991).
234. Id. at 915.
235. Id. at 914.
236. Id. at 915.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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guise of public policy, the court performed a false conflicts analysis
and applied the law of North Carolina, the only interested state.25 9
The use by lex loci courts of modern choice-of-law methods under
the guise of public policy is a positive development. It represents yet
another path for those courts to take in their gradual abandonment of
the traditional choice-of-law system.
CONCLUSION
On the silver anniversary of the Second Restatement, modern
choice-of-law theory cannot yet claim complete victory. Eleven states'
courts still use the First Restatement's lex loci rules as their dominant
choice-of-law methodology, and four more use them in contract cases
but not in tort. Further, some of the worst aspects of traditional
choice-of-law practice persist. Thus, First Restatement courts still
mechanically apply the law of the disinterested state in false conflicts
cases and still use rule manipulation and the escape devices to pro-
duce more palatable results via unprincipled opinions.
Nevertheless, a review of recent cases in traditionalist states pro-
vides reason for optimism. First, the trend toward abandonment of
the First Restatement in favor of more modem choice-of-law systems
continues. In the last ten years, nine states have deserted the First
Restatement camp, and defections continue at roughly the same rate.
Further, retentionist courts no longer insist on the metaphysics of
vested rights, relying instead on the supposed functional virtues of the
lex loci rules.
More hopeful yet is the finding that practice even among tradi-
tionalist courts tends to deviate towards modem methods in several
key areas. Thus, all contemporary lex loci courts routinely enforce
choice-of-law clauses despite Beale's disapproval; seven states have
adopted the modern alternative-reference or validation approach in
usury cases; only one court retains the lex loci delicti rule in workers'
compensation cases; and all but two use modern choice-of-law meth-
ods in U.C.C. cases.
Another positive sign is that some courts are beginning to use the
traditional escape devices of rule manipulation, recharacterization,
renvoi, and public policy not only to achieve better results, but also to
import modern choice-of-law methods into their lex loci systems.
Finally, the most positive sign is that, within a given state, devia-
tion from the lex loci tends to be progressive. Once courts begin using
modern methods in exceptional cases, they seem to acquire the habit
239. Id. at 916.
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and sometimes move progressively towards the Second Restatement as
the dominant choice-of-law methodology. This represents real pro-
gress and holds out the hope that the next twenty-five years may see
the demise of the lex loci choice-of-law regimes.
